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Transparency Norms, the World Trade System
and Free Trade Agreements:The Case of
CETA
Ljiljana BIUKOVIC´ *
Canada and the European Union (EU) are negotiating an ambitious Comprehensive Economic
and Trade Agreement (CETA).While the content of the agreement has not yet been officially
disclosed by its negotiators, the general public and the business community are already concerned
about the scope and effect of CETA on the two economies and their societies.This article deals
with CETA’s transparency provisions. It claims that, whereas CETA has not yet utilized
external transparency to ensure support for the negotiations, it does have the potential for greater
regulatory transparency in technical barriers to trade (TBT)- and sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS)-related matters than that found not only in the existing World Trade Organization
(WTO) agreements but also in free trade agreements (FTAs) the two parties previously
negotiated with third countries.
1 INTRODUCTION
As Canada and the European Union (EU) negotiate their Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), concerns are growing in the general
public and in the business community in particular, about the scope and effect of
this very ambitious treaty, the content of which has not yet been officially
disclosed by its negotiators.
The central issue of this paper is the principle of transparency as incorporated
into preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in general and CETA in particular. It
claims, first, that there has been an increasing tendency for both parties’ PTAs to
include World Trade Organization (WTO) Plus and WTO-X area clauses1 and,
second, that CETA will include several substantive legally enforceable obligations,
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1 The ‘WTO Plus’ indicates that a PTA includes enhanced obligations relating to policy areas that are
already covered by some of theWTO agreements (such as TBT and SPS related obligations) while the
WTO-X designation indicates that the PTAs are also establishing obligations for its members in policy
areas that are not covered by the currentWTO agreements (human rights, competition, labour market
regulation, environmental laws, etc.) See Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & André Sapir, ‘EU and
US Preferential Trade Agreements: Deepening or Widening of WTO Commitments’, in Preferential
Trade Agreements:A Law and Economics Analysis, ed. KyleW. Bagwell & Petros C. Mavroidis (NewYork:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 150, at 151.
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including some related to the transparency principle, that exceed the obligations
contained in theWTO agreements.
2 TRANSPARENCY IN PRACTICE AND IN DEBATES
Transparency is usually cited as the core principle underpinning the rule of law
and as a key element of good governance.2 The transparency principle in the
WTO agreements imposes on its members procedural and substantive legal
obligations that are vital to the functioning of the rule-based trade regime: (1) to
make information on the relevant laws, regulations, and other policies publicly
available; (2) to notify interested parties of the relevant laws and regulations and of
any changes to them; and (3) to ensure that the laws and regulations are
administered in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner.3 The creation in
1989 of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) as a means of monitoring
compliance with the GATT Article X requirements signalled the increasing
importance of transparency in the context of deeper economic integration.4
Many international organizations emphasize the importance of transparency
to the development of a market economy and of society in general and define the
principle in terms similar to those of the provisions of GATT Article X. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has a
two-pronged definition of transparency.The first prong is regulatory transparency
and is a measure of the capacity of regulated entities to express views on and
identify and understand their obligations under the rule of law5; the second is
information transparency on the part of governments.6 Regulatory transparency
protects the rights of private parties to be informed of laws, to be advised of
decisions that concern their rights and interests, to be provided with reasoned
decisions, and to seek reviews of such decisions.7 Thus, legal reform that leads to
regulatory transparency increases the openness of the market and reduces business
transaction costs. Information transparency includes consultation with interested
parties, the widespread electronic dissemination of regulatory materials, the use of
2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2004).
3 Article X GATT 1994.
4 WTO, World Trade Report 2011; The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Coexistence to
Coherence, at 184; available online at <www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_
report11_e.pdf>.
5 OECD, ‘Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries from Intervention to Regulatory Governance’,
PUMA/RE6 (2001) 10, 21 Nov. 2001, at 41. See also the 2005 OECD, ‘Guiding Principles for
Regulatory Quality and Performance’, available at <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/6/34976533.pdf>.
6 Ibid.
7 NERA (National Economic Research Associates) Economic Consulting, ‘Regulatory Transparency:
International Assessment and Emerging Lessons, A Final Report for the World Bank’, 6 Jun. 2005, at
147.
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plain language in drafting laws and regulations, the exercise of controls on
regulatory discretion through transparent procedures, and the establishment of
appeal processes.8
Academic debate on the principle of transparency in the international trade
regime focuses on external, internal, and regulatory transparency. External
transparency enables civil society to see what international trade regulators, such as
the WTO, are doing while internal transparency reflects the ability of members
of international organizations, such as WTO Members, to participate in the work
of the organization.9 Finally, the regulatory transparency, which constitutes an
important aspect of national administrative law, is of interest as a tool of good
governance.10
In civil society debates, the quest for full transparency includes not only the
right to be informed about the process of negotiation and the final text of the
treaty but also the right to be consulted on the issues being negotiated, especially
when they relate to human rights, health, the environment, sustainable
development and procurement. As the number of PTAs being entered into by
both developed and developing countries grows, there is mounting concern in
civil society about the lack of transparency.
3 PTAS ANDTRANSPARENCY PROVISIONS
Almost ten years ago, the WTO Working Group on the Relationship between
Trade and Investment reported that the transparency provisions in existing bilateral
and regional treaties, especially those including provisions on foreign investment,
were ‘generally less detailed and prescriptive than similar requirements in the
WTO agreements’.11 A recent OECD study of regulatory transparency regional
trade agreements (RTAs) suggests that a relative expansion of regulatory
transparency provisions in RTAs is unlikely to have affected any of the OECD
members’ already established domestic transparency mechanisms.12 On the other
hand, the RTAs with enhanced transparency provisions have strengthened the
domestic framework for those OECD countries with less developed pre-existing
8 OECD, supra n. 5.
9 Robert Wolfe, ‘Regulatory Transparency, Developing Countries and the WTO’, World Trade Review 2
(2003): 157, at 158.
10 Ibid.
11 WT/WGTI/W109, 27 Mar. 2002, at 1. See also Robert Howse & Michael J.Trebilcock, ‘The Myths
of NAFTA’s Regulatory Power: Rethinking Regionalism as a Vehicle for Deep Economic
Integration’, in Changing the Rules: Canadian Regulatory Regimes and Institutions, ed. G. Bruce Doern et
al. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1999), at 336–360.
12 Evdokia Moïsé, ‘Transparency Mechanisms and Non-tariff Measures: Case Studies’, (2011) OECD
Trade PolicyWorking papers No. 111,OECD Publishing, at 4–5.
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administrative law and regulatory practices.13 Clearly, RTA negotiations are an
opportunity for stakeholders from countries with developed regulatory regimes to
propose transparency mechanisms that would improve the accountability of
governments in developing countries and influence the level of transparency in
their domestic cultures.
The above-mentioned OECD study divides the RTAs’ regulatory
transparency-related provisions into three broad categories: (1) general
transparency provisions related to transparency in the administration of laws and
regulations relevant to all matters covered by the RTA, including information
availability, public consultation and due process; (2) specific transparency provisions
related to goods covered by the agreement (technical barriers to trade (TBT) and
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) type provisions14); and (3) specific transparency
provisions related to the regulation of services. The RTAs’ general transparency
provisions tend to replicate the due process provisions of GATT Article X and do
not provide additional opportunities (such as additional review or appeal rights)
for stakeholders to affect the process of rule-making.They normally carry no more
weight than ‘a best endeavours call for public consultation’.15 In contrast, theTBT-
and SPS-related RTA transparency provisions often tend to expand on
corresponding WTO provisions and set out in greater detail the parties’
obligations with respect to standards, technical regulations, and assessment
procedures.16 They have been used in RTAs among developed countries,
developing countries and a mix of developed-developing countries. For example,
some RTAs such as the Australia-United States and the Canada-Peru free trade
agreements (FTAs) require each participating state to allow not only its own
nationals but also private persons from the other states to participate in the
development of domestic standards and technical regulations.17 The OECD study
further reveals that fewer RTAs provide for enhanced provisions relating to
administration of the domestic regulation of services, specially telecommunications
and financial services.18 It appears that the negotiated trade agreements that are
WTO Plus are more likely to expand the regulatory transparency arrangements
beyondWTO standards.
13 Ibid., at 9.
14 Ibid.
15 Moïsé, supra n. 12, at 11. The author of the study also emphasized that this type of provision is less
common among non-OECD RTAs.
16 Ibid., at 12.
17 Ibid., at 10.
18 Ibid., at 13.
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4 THE EU AND FTAS
Arrangements related to external, internal and regulatory transparency in the EU’s
agreements with developed countries have been rather flexible, primarily due to
the similarities in the prevalent domestic transparency mechanisms of the partners.
In contrast, the EU uses more elaborate political and economic conditionality in
negotiating bilateral trade agreements with developing countries in order to
promote its own transparency rules or otherwise mandate harmonization of those
countries’ regulatory policies with the EU standards;19 thus, the principle of
transparency is an important element in both aspects of conditionality.
Economic conditionality establishes different sets of rules for economic
cooperation between the EU and developing countries, depending on their
standing in the WTO,20 the extent to which their market economies have
developed, and their ability to cope with the competitive pressures of the free
trade area created by the agreement.21 Again, good governance (and the
underlying principle of transparency) is a fundamental prerequisite for economic
cooperation between the partners to an agreement.22
The external transparency elements – exposing to civil society how the
various trade regulators work – have been left out of the EU-third countries treaty
negotiation process and have instead been treated as a domestic issue for each
partner. Consequently, the EU has developed its own rules on the engagement for
civil society while developing countries have had to work out their own ways of
‘selling’ the trade arrangements to their populations and ensuring the required
levels of support.23 The recent working document of the Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament (EP) reveals that
the EP has been eager to assess the implementation of the principle of
transparency in the EU institutions as a general principle of the EU legal order,
especially after the entry into force of Regulation No. 1049/2001 and the Lisbon
Treaty.24 The Committee finds that since the Lisbon Treaty transparency principle
19 Leonardo Baccini, ‘Explaining Formation and Design of EU Trade Agreements: The Role of
Transparency and Flexibility’,European Union Politics 11 (2010): 195, at 197–198.
20 For example, The Bahamas, one of thirteen CARIFORUM states, is a non-WTO Member. The
CARIFORUM-EC EPA, signed in Barbados on 15 Oct. 2008 between the CARIFORUM and the
EU is a comprehensive agreement covering not only trade in goods, services, IP and innovation but
also transparency in public procurement, investment, competition , environment, and personal data
protection.The agreement also has a complex Development Chapter.
21 The Copenhagen Protocol and the Barcelona Process are examples of these different arrangements.
22 <http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm>.
23 For a summary of the EU’s mechanisms of public participation, see Yves Bonzon, ‘Comparative
Analysis of Transparency and Public Participation Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and
Other International Regimes’, EGDEWorkshop (March 2008), on file with the author.
24 EP Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,Working Document (1) on the Annual
Report on public access to documents, 24 Jan. 2011, DT/854597EN.doc, at 2.
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is ‘also linked with the principles of civic participation and of good administration’
it binds not only the main EU institutions (EP, Council, Commission, the
European Council, the European Central Bank and the Court of Justice) but also
numerous EU agencies and services, including the European External Action
Service.25 Moreover, the Committee emphasizes that the Lisbon Treaty repealed
Articles 255 and 207(3) of the former Treaty of European Community, which had
allowed for some limits to transparency for the purpose of ‘the preservation of the
effectiveness of the decision making process’. Although the Committee accepts
that certain negotiations of international agreements require a degree of
confidentiality, it asks the EU institutions, especially the Council and Commission,
to establish a balance between transparency and effectiveness ‘at least through an
indirect transparency’ set up for EU citizens through their elected parliamentary
representatives. 26
Regulatory transparency provisions in the EU’s PTAs and FTAs are typically
limited to one general provision, which usually follows the GATT Article X
requirements.27 More stringent provisions (if any) are included in more specific
areas, such as those related to the TBT and SPS obligations of the parties. In the
areas in which the EU requires greater clarity from its partners and an
improvement of their administration of the various measures and standards laid
out, the regulatory transparency provisions are decidedly more stringent. 28
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., at 4.The EU Ambassador to India, Daniele Smadja (previously EU Ambassador to Canada) was
recently cited in India for saying that EU-India FTA ‘negotiations are not an open book’ and that it
would not be appropriate to provide any details about the FTA negotiations when the talks were at a
sensitive stage. See ‘Free Trade Agreement Talks at “Sensitive Stage” ’, The Hindu, 17 Feb. 2011. In
February 2011, the Corporate Europe Observatory, a citizen advocacy group, filed a complaint before
the EU General Court about lack of transparency in the EU’s negotiation of a free trade agreement
with India. The claimant alleges that the Commission refused to forward to the citizens’ group
documents it did share with industry lobby groups, such as Business Europe. See <www.business-
standard.com/india/news/eu-arm-being-suedindia-fta-talks/425344/>.
27 See, e.g., the FTA between the EU and Chile (EU-Chile Association Agreement (2002/979/EC) O.J.
L/352, 30 Dec. 2002), where there is a general reference to transparency but details are to be
developed by the parties in the course of the performance of the agreement.
28 See, e.g., Art. 4.4: technical regulations of the EU-Korea FTA (2002/979/EC) O.J. L/127, 14 May
2011) obliging the regulators of the parties or standard making bodies to give written reasoned
response to these parties’ submissions or comments on the rules and requiring that each party shall
ensure that economic actors and other interested persons of the other party are allowed to participate
in any formal public consultative process concerning development of technical regulations, on terms
no less favourable than those accorded to is own legal or natural persons.
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5 CANADA AND FTAS
Canada’s FTAs generally contain no explicit provisions on external transparency.29
It appears that Canada’s increased interest in external transparency in negotiating
international, multilateral, regional and bilateral treaties is triggered by domestic
criticism of the government’s own secretive decision making. Critics usually point
out that the lack of external and internal transparency in the WTO and NAFTA
processes make these treaties less accessible to the public than domestic judicial
proceedings, less accountable to domestic democratic institutions and, ultimately,
contrary to the normative principles, rules, rights and institutional practices of
Canadian society.30 On the other hand, the Canadian government maintains, as do
many other governments, that increased external transparency, although it could be
an important means of bolstering the legitimacy of the government and of
international organizations could weaken the nation’s bargaining position vis-à-vis
other developed (and some developing) countries.31
In general, agreements between Canada and other developed countries
contain less elaborate regulatory transparency provisions than do those with
developing countries. For example, the Canada-EFTA Agreement signed in 2009
has modest general transparency provisions related to information availability and
equally modest specific transparency provisions on the disclosure of information to
authorities.32 In contrast to the Canada-EFTA FTA, the Canada-Columbia FTA
contains broad general regulatory transparency provisions (Chapter 19) as well as
more detailed specific regulatory transparency provisions on telecommunications
and financial services (Articles 1010 and 1111, respectively), on e-commerce
(Article 1502), government procurement (Article 1407) and TBT and SPS
measures (Articles 601–608 and 504, respectively).
29 Canada has concluded nine FTAs (including NAFTA) since 1984 and has been negotiating twelve
additional agreements, including the CETA. Most of those are FTAs that involve developing countries
as partners. See status of Canadian FTAs at <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx>.
30 See one of the most recent criticisms of democratic deficit of the WTO and NAFTA
‘superconstitutionalism’ in Stephen Clarkson & Stephen Wood, A Perilous Imbalance;The Globalization
of Canadian Law and Governance (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), at 104–113.
31 Ana-Meri Hamada & Markus Knigge, Report on Trade, Environment, and Transparency and
Participation, June 2005, Research DG, under Contract No. EVK2-CT-2002-20017 CAT&E, at 7.
32 The Canada-EFTA contains general regular transparency provisions in Art. 37 and specific trans-
parency provisions related to trade in services in Art. 12; Art. 20 only suggests that transparency in
relation to government procurement rights be a topic for future agreement between the two parties.
Moreover, Art. 12 establishes a ‘best endeavour’ type of obligation to provide information on any
measure that might have an impact on trade in services or investment. The Canada-Israel FTA
contains provisions that cover the entire agreement but are of a general rather than a specific nature. It
also calls for regulatory transparency consultations between the two parties on regulatory transparency
(Arts 8.5 and 8.6. and 20).
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Except for its side agreements on labour and environmental cooperation,
which contain provisions on public participation in advisory committees, NAFTA
is very modest, almost silent, on external transparency; it focuses more on the
general transparency provisions related to internal and regulatory transparency.33
For example, the measures introduced in 2003 to enhance transparency of the
NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration (acceptance of amicus curiae briefs
and the endorsement of a standard form for the Notice of Intent to initiate
arbitration) were specifically intended to improve public participation in and
understanding of the dispute settlement process.Yet, NAFTA has had a significant
influence on the country’s subsequent FTAs negotiations. For example, in the
2008 Canada-Chile FTA, the transparency rules in the Chapter on Government
Procurement are based on the NAFTA provisions with the addition of some
extended transparency measures.34 The 2009 FTA between Canada and Peru is
also based on NAFTA, but with extended general and specific transparency
provisions.35
6 CETA
Despite occasional briefings by the parties on the progress of negotiations, the
general view in both Canada and the EU, especially among civil society groups, is
that the negotiations are, for the most part, ignoring the concerns of civil society
and the public at large while supporting interests of business community.36 This
negative attitude towards the proposed agreement has its source in the fact that
some of the substantive areas of negotiations to be covered in the negotiations are
ones that seriously undermine the regulatory sovereignty of municipalities,
provinces, and higher levels of government (the rules on government
33 Bonzon, supra n. 24, at 12.
34 See <www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/dcgpubs/ContPolNotices/2008/1217-eng.asp>. See Arts Kbis-03,
04, 06, 11 related to government procurement. Very general transparency provisions that cover the
entire agreement are in Art. L-03.
35 Canada-Peru FTA: general regulatory transparency provisions in relation to the whole agreement
contained in Arts 504 and 1901–1904; specific transparency provisions contained in Arts 1010
(telecommunications), 1111 (financial services), 1404, 1407, 1410–1411, 1413 (government
procurement), and1504–1506 (e-commerce).
36 See, e.g., Open Civil Society Declaration on a proposed Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement between Canada and the European Union, signed by a number of organizations, available
at <http://tradejustice.ca/en/section/22>. See also Centre for Civic Governance at <www.civic
governance.ca/taxonomy/term/109>, We Are Change Toronto at <http://wearechangetoronto
.org/2011/01/27/from-nafta-to-ceta-canada-eu-deep-economic-integration/>, Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives at <www.policyalternatives.ca/newsroom/news-releases/canada-eu-free-trade-
deal-could-cost-150000-canadian-jobs-study>.
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procurement, for example).37 Furthermore, some recent reports on the benefits of
the CETA show just a modest economic gain for the EU and Canada as a result of
further liberalization of trade between the two parties.38
The Government of Canada and the Commission of the EU had earlier made
a non-binding commitment to a set of what they considered to be good
regulatory practices and had established the Framework on Regulatory
Co-operation and Transparency.39 According to the Framework, good regulatory
practice consists of consultations and the exchange of information among the
domestic regulators in the two parties, the sharing of non-public information, the
sharing of information on regulatory proposals, the monitoring of forthcoming
regulatory proposals, the post-implementation review of regulations, etc.Although
the Framework does not directly address the principle of transparency, it is obvious
that in order for the two parties’ regulators to act in accordance with this
Framework, full transparency is required. However, the Framework encourages the
Government of Canada and the Commission to act in the proposed manner but
does not mandate that they do so.
As previously mentioned, both Canada and the EU usually negotiate FTA
provisions related to regulatory transparency along the lines of the GATT Article
X provisions, with an emphasis on the obligations of each party to inform the
other of relevant legislative proposals and to allow the other party’s interested
persons to comment on such proposals. Indeed, the provisions related to regulatory
transparency reveal very little difference between the regulatory approaches by the
EU and Canada. However, in a recently concluded FTA with South Korea, the
first of the EU’s new generation of FTAs,40 the EU recommended a ‘best
endeavour’ type of obligations with respect to the duty to publish legislative
proposals in advance and to provide information on and respond to questions
pertaining to any existing or proposed measure.41 The provision’s wording
arguably shows somewhat less of a commitment to transparency. Since the
Directorate General for External Policies called the Korea FTA ‘one of the most
37 Most recently the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), the largest labour union in the
country, passed a resolution (Resolution No. 233) opposing CETA and criticizing its negotiation
process as being non-transparent. See <http://cupe.ca/cupe-national-convention/convention-
decisions-tuesday-november-1>.
38 EU-Canada SIA Draft Final Report March 2011,Trade 10/3B/B06, available online at <http://trade
.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147755.pdf>.
39 Available online at <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/eu-
ue/eu-framework.aspx?view=d>.
40 The 2006 Communication ‘Global Europe: Competing in theWorld’ from the European Commission
proposed a new generation of bilateral free trade agreements as a stepping stone for future trade
liberalization. See <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130376.pdf>.
41 See EU-Korea FTA, Ch. XII,Transparency.
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ambitious and complete commercial deals ever negotiated by the EU’,42 it is
difficult to foresee that CETA would provide for less strict obligations.
The scope of the EU-Korea FTA is also a useful starting point of discussion
about a possible scope of CETA.The EU-Korea FTA is the most comprehensive
FTA of the EU already in force and it contains chapters on trade and sustainable
developments with substantive commitments on labour and environmental
standards, a monitoring mechanism and a clause on enhancement of the dialogue
with the civil society (representative organizations of employers, workers,
environmental interest and business groups, local communities, etc.). Since it has
been suggested that CETA is also one of the EU’s new generation FTAs, one can
expect similar provisions related to trade and sustainable development to be
proposed by the EU. Transparency provisions related to sustainable development
could be regarded as specific regulatory transparency provisions that would have
considerable impact on external transparency related to the performance of CETA.
They could potentially provide for increased transparency in decision-making and
for civil society groups to play at least a consultative role in the area of sustainable
development with the actual extent of involvement of these groups to be
determined in accordance with the domestic laws of the parties.43 It is noteworthy
that the current FTAs containing provisions on labour and sustainable
development usually provide that each party is obliged to introduce and
implement measures related to sustainable development, labour conditions and the
protection of the environment, and must do so in a transparent manner and in
accordance with its domestic law.44 In addition, the parties of the EU-Korea FTA are
required to (or shall) ‘encourage public debate with and among non-State actors as
regards the development and definition of priorities that may lead to the adoption
by public authorities of such measures or of non-binding recommendations or
guidance’.45 Accordingly, it is possible to expect that the EU would propose a
similar chapter and provisions to be included into CETA to mandate that the
parties have access to information on the work of joint institutions formed to
monitor implementation of specific chapters and provisions and on the work of
domestic regulatory agencies dealing also with matters related to trade and
sustainable development.
It is noteworthy that the EU-Korea FTA contains numerous provisions
addressing regulatory and technical issues.This is consistent in particular with the
EU’s new policy towards FTAs and the Commission’s 2006 Communication
42 See The ‘EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement in Practice’ (Luxembourg: Publication of the Office of the
European Union, 2011).
43 EU-Korea FTA,Arts 13.9–13.13.
44 WTO,‘TheWTOTrade Report 2011’, supra n. 4, at 63.
45 EU-Korea FTA,Art. 13.9.
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‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’, which proposed a more robust and
competitiveness-driven FTA as new model for EU’s bilateral trade agreements.
The WTO World Trade Report on patterns in the content of PTAs identifies
similar trend in PTAs concluded by other countries.46 FTAs regulation of both
tariff and non-tariff barriers has thus become a priority for EU negotiators,
especially in negotiating FTAs with advanced developing and developed countries
whereTBT measures constitute barriers to market access for EU exporters.
The transparency provisions in the Chapter on Customs and Trade
Facilitation in the EU-Korea FTA, for example, mandate that prior to their
adoption, each party shall provide interested persons the opportunity to comment
on them and shall designate or mandate one or more contact points to which
interested persons may address inquires on customs-related matters.The Internet is
suggested as a proper source of information on available procedures, legislation and
policies and as a means to ensure external transparency.47 It is not difficult to
foresee similar provisions being proposed by the EU for CETA.
Considering the importance of trade in food and agricultural goods between
the EU and Canada and the impact that safety and technical standards have on
market access, the CETA’s TBT and SPS specific provisions on regulatory
transparency are particularly important topics in the negotiations.48 Increased
transparency through an effective system of notification measures could impact
standard setting by raising the awareness among each party’s public agencies and
private parties of the TBT and the SPS rights and obligations, by informing each
party’s public and private sectors of forthcoming changes in technical and SPS
standards and by responding to their questions and concerns. Agricultural
protectionism through non-TBT has been a contentious issue of Canada-EC
relations from the time that the parties started to negotiate the 1976 Framework
Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation.49 The Joint Cooperation
Committee working within the loose institutional structure of the Framework
Agreement was inadequate to the task of coordinating the regulatory practices of
the two parties.
In general, the WTO TBT Agreement imposes the obligation on WTO
Members to provide basic regulatory transparency with respect to technical
standards for all industrial and agricultural products.50 Especially important are the
46 WTO,WorldTrade Report 2011, supra n. 4, at 129–145.
47 EU-Korea FTA,Art. 6.5.3.
48 Substantive provisions on the use of international standards, mutual recognition, voluntary standards
and equivalence, as well as the relevant common institutional structure are beyond the scope of this
article.
49 Christopher Kukucha, ‘Provincial Pitfalls: Canadian Provinces and the Canada-EU Trade
Negotiations’ (2009).
50 Article 1.3TBT Agreement.
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legally enforceable obligations of WTO Members to give prior notification of
any regulatory activities that deviate from internationally accepted standards51 and
to take into account the comments of the other WTO Members regarding any
proposed changes in technical regulations.52 In summary, the provisions being
inserted to enhance transparency are intended to prevent the use of technical
regulations as a non-tariff barrier to trade in products.
According to documents released recently by the Parliament of Canada,
complaints from Canadian exporters about the complexity of the EU Regulations
and standards and the European Commission’s failure to facilitate trade in the
most important industrial and agricultural sectors are leading Canada, in its
negotiations with the EU, to push for increased transparency in TBT regulations
and standards.53 Thus, it is expected that the Canadian negotiators will insist on
stricter transparency provisions than those set out in the WTO TBT Agreement,
including early notification by each party of regulatory measures and standards that
each proposes to adopt. It is also expected that Canada will propose that a separate
chapter of the treaty be dedicated to enhanced regulatory cooperation provisions
as a means of improving transparency and preventing the parties from adopting
conflicting standards. TBT and SPS standard type provisions in PTAs require the
parties to institute very specific domestic policies and to meet certain minimum
specifications as regard institutional capacity. If the parties intend to make
commitments beyond the WTO obligations, the PTAs have to provide them with
legal and institutional frameworks capable of reducing non-tariff barriers to trade
by enhancing regulatory cooperation and limiting their autonomy with respect to
the relevant domestic policies.54
It is noteworthy that in its FTAs with countries that are not the EU
neighbours or candidates for EU membership, the EU used to rely more on
existing international TBT-related standards than on the promotion of its own
‘experience’, which includes the precautionary principle or application of the EU
acquis.55 In other words, in these FTAs, the EU tends to stick with the WTO
framework rules while trying to strengthen transparency by adding measures such
as early notification, technical cooperation and the sharing of expertise between
the parties’ domestic agencies.56 For example, the EU-Chile FTA simply confirms
51 Article 2.9.2 TBT Agreement.
52 Article 2.9.4 TBT Agreement.
53 Alexandre Gauthier & Michael Holden, Canada-European Union Trade Negotiations: 7. Technical
Barriers toTrade and Regulatory Cooperation, 3 Oct. 2010, no. 2010-58-E, at 2.
54 Kenneth Heydon & Stephen Woolcock, The Rise of Bilateralism (Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2009), at 72.
55 For example, the EU tried to harmonize the TBT standards and practice of Euro-Med countries to
EU standards, but in the EU-Chile FTA the EU offered broad options of international standards,
mutual recognition and equivalency.
56 Article 50 of the EU-CARIFORUM FTA.
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the rights of the parties under the WTO TBT Agreement and contains a simple
reference to transparency with no details. NAFTA provides for prior notification
and for interested parties to have access to national regulatory processes. On the
other hand, in the EU’s first new generation FTA with Korea,TBT provisions go
beyond the obligations contained in the WTO TBT Agreement.57 Considering
interests of Canadian exporters and the EU’s new approach to market access in
PTAs, the new CETA will probably enhance parties’ transparency-related
obligations beyond those stipulated in theTBT and SPS Agreements.
In addition to direct incorporation of the WTO TBT and SPS Agreements
(for which both parties established domestic enquiry points), the EU-Korea FTA
provides for enhanced regulatory cooperation through the establishment of a
number of specialized institutions, such joint committees,58 working groups, and
coordinators59 who monitor the implementation of the agreement and facilitate
regulatory dialogue between the parties’ governmental bodies and agencies. In the
same way, CETA provisions could potentially provide for TBT and SPS
Committees, and sub-committees and ad-hoc technical working groups as well as
national standard-making bodies to facilitate implementation of the relevant
CETA provisions. In terms of transparency, the CETA provisions on TBT and SPS
related matters will probably require the parties to provide early notification of any
new regulatory measures and to keep each other informed on any significant
changes to the structure, organization and jurisdiction of their competent
authorities.60 The latter obligation is especially important considering the
difference in standard-making systems between the parties and the complaints
already voiced by Canadian exporters and the EU Commission.
In summary, it is possible that the CETATBT chapter will contain a provision
requiring the parties to ensure participation of interested persons at an appropriate
early stage in the amendment of technical regulations and the assessment of
conformity procedures and to consider the parties’ comments on such regulation.
Such provision allowing stakeholders from one party to participate in the
57 ‘The EU-Korea FreeTrade Agreement in Practice’, supra n. 42, at 8.
58 EU-Korea FTA Art. 15.2.
59 EU-Korea FTA Art. 4.10.1: ‘The Parties agree to nominate TBT Coordinators and to give appropriate
information to the other Party when their TBT coordinator changes. The TBT Coordinators shall
work jointly in order to facilitate the implementation of this Chapter and cooperation between the
Parties in all matters pertaining to this Chapter.’
60 This will be an enhanced obligation in comparison with Ch. 4:TBT of the EU-Korea FTA.
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development of the other party’s technical regulations will be very important and
will certainly go beyond a best endeavors duty. In that case, it will be important
that the parties provide a definition of ‘technical regulation’ and who exactly
would be considered for the purpose of this chapter to be ‘an interested person’
entitled to participate in the development of technical standards. Would such
participation be limited only to the development of technical standards that
deviate from the relevant international standards, or would it apply to any technical
regulations? For example, EU-Korea FTA does not have such definitions.
Assuming that CETA does not have such definitions, the question is what the
impact of such transparency procedures would be on the administration of
technical regulations in Canada (and in the EU). If there is also no definition of
‘interested parties’ in the agreement, one could understand them to be any legal
persons. And suppose that there is no such transparency obligation for the federal
or provincial government in Canada, or any other relevant Canadian
standard-making body, would that automatically preclude EU economic actors
from the consultation process?
Similarly to the TBT Chapter, CETA will certainly provide for a higher level
of stringency in administering the SPS related rules for at least two reasons. First,
this is a part of the EU’s new strategy of negotiating FTAs, and it has already been
used in EU-Korea FTA. That agreement contains specific commitments on
transparency in the context of SPS issues and the applications of international
standards.61 Second, the commercial preferences in the EU have been impacting
EU regulatory measures and accordingly market access of agricultural goods and
products from Canada. As previously mentioned, Canadian exporters have already
requested that the government negotiates enhanced transparency provisions in
order to prevent agricultural protectionism.
6 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION
CETA is following trends in the growth and development of PTAs by moving
beyond WTO negotiated trade policy to cover a wider range of issues, such as
services, TBT, SPS, investment, and intellectual property in greater detail and to
include issues currently excluded from multilateral negotiations such as
competition, sustainable development, and government procurement.62 What
implications these enhanced transparency may have on the future of CETA and
the parties’ existing WTO obligations towards third countries remains to be seen.
61 EU-Korea FTA, Ch. 5.
62 On current trends in PTA negotiations in general and PTAs among the developed countries in
particular, see WTO, World Trade 2011, supra n. 4. The Report specifically emphasizes that the WTO
plusTBT provisions promote increased regulatory transparency; see 139–140.
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Transparency is an essential factor for facilitating the efficient regulation of these
areas being negotiated under CETA and also in providing public understanding of
(if not support for) shared trade liberalization commitments between the parties,
especially in areas of national priority. It is in the latter area that CETA has not yet
utilized transparency to ensure support for the negotiations. Consequently, the
picture that one may piece together from the limited information disclosed to the
public on the process of negotiations is a vague one.
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